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Abstract
Building on Rinaldi and Bekker’s scoping review of articles on the impact of populist radical right (PRR) politics 
on welfare and population health, this short article formulates three pointers towards a framework that might help 
structure future research into PRR, populist politics more generally, and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and 
other health issues. First, we discuss the centrality of welfare chauvinism to the PRR’s impact on health, taking this 
as a cue for a broader reflection on the importance on distinguishing between the nativist and populist dimensions 
of PRR politics. Secondly, we turn our attention to the potential moderating effect of the PRR’s welfare chauvinism 
on the welfare cuts proposed by their right-wing coalition partners, comments we see as pointing to the need to 
focus on nativist, populist, neoliberal and other threats to welfare policy more generally, rather than on the PRR 
only. Thirdly, we reflect on the paradoxical nature of welfare chauvinism – its negative consequences for the health 
of the ‘own people’ it proclaims to defend – as a starting point for a brief discussion of the need to consider carefully 
the not-so-straightforward relation between the PRR’s political rhetoric, its (impact on) policy and institutions, and 
the outcomes of such policy.
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Never has the impact of populist radical right (PRR) politics on health policy been higher on the public agenda than since the outbreak of the coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. US President Trump’s 
and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s management of the 
crisis in particular has attracted much (negative) attention 
from media and commentators.
Written before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Chiara Rinaldi and Marleen P.M. Bekker’s article1 presents 
a scoping review of 15 articles about the impact of populist 
radical parties on welfare policy and population health. A few 
years from now, such a scoping review will have to cover a far 
larger number of articles as wave of academic publications on 
COVID-19 and populism and the radical right is likely coming 
our way. In this short piece we comment on the Rinaldi and 
Bekker article. We would also like to take the opportunity 
to build on Rinaldi and Bekker’s work to formulate a few 
potential indicators towards a framework that might help 
structure future research into populism, the radical right and 
COVID-19 and other welfare and health issues.
Rinaldi and Bekker’s review of existing work almost 
unavoidably produces rather scattered results. This is due to 
the limited number of articles on the PRR and welfare policy, 
the diversity of approaches in the articles they collected, the 
differences between national contexts, as well as the inherent 
difficulty of measuring the impact on welfare policy and its 
outcomes of a collection of PRR parties that show quite some 
diversity. Still, Rinaldi and Bekker’s article points to a number 
of significant findings.
In our comment we reflect on three of Rinaldi and Bekker’s 
insights that we consider to be of major importance to 
further research into the PRR, welfare policy and population 
health. In a first section we discuss the centrality of welfare 
chauvinism to the PRR’s impact on health, taking this as a cue 
for a broader reflection on the importance on distinguishing 
between the nativist and populist dimensions of PRR politics. 
In a second section we turn our attention to Rinaldi and 
Bekker’s comments on the potential moderating effect of the 
PRR’s welfare chauvinism on the welfare cuts proposed by their 
right-wing coalition partners, comments we see as pointing to 
the need to focus on nativist, populist, neoliberal threats (as 
well as other threats to welfare more generally), rather than on 
the PRR only. In a third and final section we take Rinaldi and 
Bekker’s insightful remark about the paradoxical nature of 
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welfare chauvinism – its negative consequences for the health 
of the ‘own people’ it proclaims to defend – as a starting point 
for a brief discussion of the need to consider carefully the 
not-so-straightforward relation between the PRR’s political 
rhetoric, its (impact on) policy and institutions, and the 
health outcomes of such policy.
1. Welfare Chauvinism and the Nativism and Populism of 
the Radical Right
The main conclusion Rinaldi and Bekker draw from their 
review is that “[w]elfare chauvinism is the most prominent 
channel through which PRR parties could adversely affect 
population health and health equity in Europe, as welfare 
chauvinistic policies have the potential to directly affect 
access to welfare provisions for vulnerable (immigrant) 
groups” (p. 8). The impact of PRR parties in government, 
they find from their review, works through direct exclusion 
of migrants from welfare benefits (an example they give 
is Sweden reducing aid to vulnerable EU immigrants) and, 
more often, indirectly, “through policies that are targeted at 
the entire population but affect ‘undeserving’ (immigrant) 
populations disproportionally, such as policies that restrict 
eligibility to unemployment benefits” (p. 6). Moreover, even 
where PRR parties are not in government, Rinaldi and Bekker 
indicate, “mainstream parties of either side of the political 
spectrum were found to allow or even propose exclusionary 
welfare policies as a reaction to PRR electoral success” (p. 9).
As Rinaldi and Bekker rightly indicate (p. 6), welfare 
chauvinism is rooted in the PRR’s nativism (an exclusionary 
ethnic nationalism that favours the ‘native’ population) and 
– less directly so, we would say – from their authoritarian 
defence of “those ‘morally deserving’ of support” (p. 6). 
Without stating it so explicitly, Rinaldi and Bekker’s review 
confirms that PRR politics are first and foremost nativist (and 
authoritarian) rather than populist.2 This is a crucial point, 
and a point where Rinaldi and Bekker avoid some of the 
common problems in discussions on the PRR. All too often, 
PRR parties are labelled as simply ‘populist,’ especially in 
media coverage and political commentary.3
There are several problems with this equation between 
‘populist radical right’ and ‘populist.’ First of all, it obscures 
the fact that the ideological core of PRR politics is nativism, 
and not populism.4 Secondly, the use of the term ‘populism’ 
per se tends to conflate radical right and radical left populisms, 
ignoring the ideological divide between such left and right 
types of populist politics – a cleavage that clearly shows in the 
difference between the exclusionary welfare chauvinism of 
the right and the ‘inclusionary populist’ approach to welfare 
of the left.5 And thirdly, labelling the PRR as simply ‘populist’ 
tends to conceptually conflate populism with exclusionary 
ethnic nationalism (or nativism), seeing the exclusion of 
national ‘others’ as intrinsic to populism. This misses the 
crucial analytical distinction between populism, nativism and 
nationalism more broadly.
We see populism not as a thin ideology (as Rinaldi and 
Bekker do, following Cas Mudde) but as a political logic that 
revolves around the bringing together of different demands 
and groups through the discursive construction of a vertical 
distinction between ‘the people’ as a large powerless group, 
or underdog, and ‘the elite’ as a small group whose power 
is illegitimate because they do not represent ‘the people,’ 
with populist political forces claiming to represent ‘the 
people’ against that illegitimate elite. Nationalist politics, by 
comparison, revolve around the claim to represent the people-
as-nation, defined through a differentiation based on territory, 
language, shared history, and ethnicity that is horizontal, 
in/out (which can of course have elements of superiority/
inferiority).6-8 This definition of nationalism allows for more 
or less inclusive/open or exclusive/closed definitions of the 
nation and the more or less radical conclusions draws from 
that in terms of both migration policy (expelling migrants, 
integration, cultural diversity) and national independence 
(from an independent state to cultural autonomy within a 
plurinational state).6 Nativism is a term used for a particular 
breed of nationalist politics that revolve around an ethnic 
and exclusionary definition of the nation and the defence of 
the ‘natives’ against national outsiders; even if the distinction 
between ethnic-nativist and more open and inclusionary, 
‘civic’ nationalist politics is by no means clear-cut. In any 
case, a clear analytical distinction between nationalism (of 
whatever kind) and populism is needed in order to be able to 
grasp the intricate entanglement of populism and nationalism 
in PRR politics (or in other kinds of politics, for that matter). 
The populist logic per se is never solely politically of the 
right, the left or the centre. The ways in which populism 
plays out is contingent upon the actors using that logic and 
the context in which this occurs. It is the underpinning social 
rationality which the populist tropes are mobilised in support 
of that might more readily be characterised as being of the 
right, the left or the centre. In this, we take a direct line from 
Laclau’s work on the populist discursive political logic when 
he argues that “populism’s relative ideological simplicity 
and emptiness should be approached in terms of what those 
processes of simplification [of the political space into ‘people’ 
versus ‘elite’] and emptying attempt to perform, that is to 
say, the social rationality they express.”9 This means that the 
notion of populism is never sufficient to characterize the 
politics of any political actor and that analyses should always 
consider what kind of political a populist political logic is 
used to promote, and how the populist categories ‘the people’ 
and ‘the elite’ acquire meaning in relation to other ideological 
categories such as ‘the nation’ or ‘social class.’ 
As such, the near absence of reflections about populism in 
Rinaldi and Bekker’s work – whilst avoiding common pitfalls 
in speaking about populism – is also a limitation. There are 
two primary reasons for this. One is that the PRR’s populist 
claim to represent the people-as-underdog and oppose ‘the 
elite’- whilst not ideologically central – is a crucial element 
of its rhetoric, and a major factor in its electoral appeal. PRR 
rhetoric and success hinge on the entanglement between 
defending national sovereignty, excluding migrants and 
foreigners, and claiming to represent the ordinary people 
against the elite. This populism is also one of the main 
strategies for legitimizing nativist positions as representing 
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the ‘voice of the people,’ with that claim being accepted across 
much of the political spectrum and thus exerting influence on 
the positions of the PRR’s contenders.10 
Secondly, whilst we should be very careful not to equate 
populism with ‘post-truth politics’ or anti-expertise 
positions,11,12 it is clear that the radical right has regularly 
used populist strategies to delegitimize the expertise of 
journalists, academics and others, also in the context of 
health. An example here would be the number of PRR parties 
allied with anti-vaccination movements both at national and 
international levels.5 
There is no necessary correspondence between populism 
and negative impacts on health. Left populisms have often 
included demands for welfare provisions and accessible 
healthcare.13 It is even possible that in some instances the 
populism of the radical right might have positive effects 
on welfare policies (for the natives) as well. Indeed, a third 
reason why populism needs to be included in reflections 
on the PRR and health is that the PRR’s populist claim to 
represent the ‘ordinary people,’ in close combination with its 
welfare chauvinism might sometimes urge them to take pro-
welfare stances (albeit reserved for the ‘native’ population). 
The Belgian Vlaams Belang is a clear example here (at least in 
its rhetoric, see point 3 below), the party consistently offering 
voters the choice between more welfare for ‘the own people’ 
and financing migration and asylum and solidarity with the 
poorer South of the country. Moreover, Rinaldi and Bekker 
write that 
“[m]ost PRR parties in Europe have entered the executive 
government office in centre-right government coalitions with 
ambitions for welfare retrenchment. PRR parties thus face 
a trade-off between supporting the retrenchment proposals 
of their coalition partners to establish a coalition agreement 
(office-seeking behaviour) or enforcing welfare policies 
that benefit their electorate more directly (vote-seeking 
behaviour)” (p. 7). 
This passage is remarkable in that it suggests that the PRR 
is not only a threat to welfare and health through its exclusion 
of ‘non-natives,’ its welfare chauvinism and populism in 
some cases also constitute a counter-weight to the welfare 
cuts proposed by their right-wing contenders and coalition 
partners. Whilst Rinaldi and Bekker’s article is focused on the 
PRR, their argument here can be said to constitute a warning 
against an exclusive focus on the PRR as a threat to healthcare.
2. Against an Exclusive Focus on the Populist Radical Right 
There is no doubt that the PRR’s impact on population health 
merits dedicated attention. But this should not be to the 
detriment of critical analysis of the record of parties in the 
political center, whose often neoliberally inspired welfare cuts 
have likely impacted population health negatively much more 
so than the PRR has so managed to do (so far). Moreover, 
even if our focus is on the impact of nativism and populism 
(rather than neoliberalism), we should be careful not to fix 
our analysis too much at the point of the PRR as parties. If 
what we are interested in is ideology, policy and actual impact 
on health, then the performance of nativism and populism, 
by and through various political actors merits closer analysis, 
rather than the impact of a certain set of parties per se.
Why do we characterise this as a risk? By conceiving of 
nativism and populism as a property of the PRR, in part this 
functions to make such politics marginal, and to categorise 
them as outside of the political mainstream. The risk is that 
this then fails to hold to account many of those mainstream 
politicians, who draw from those self-same nativist and 
populist tropes. Only when they do so, it is not regarded as 
populist or dangerously nativist, because it does not occur in 
a marginal political context. 
For example, consider the role of nativism and populism 
within the UK Conservative Party in the Brexit campaign. 
This party is not a PRR organisation, yet it consistently 
utilised nativist and populist tropes in the Brexit referendum. 
In the context of health, they blamed so-called ‘health 
tourists’ for the state of the beleaguered UK National Health 
Service when the evidence suggests that the United Kingdom 
is actually a net exporter of health tourists to the EU.14 This 
trope functions to conflate questions of access to healthcare 
with questions of immigration, constructing and invoking a 
‘threat’ that immigration poses for the native population in 
accessing healthcare. This example also leads onto our final 
argument.
3. Health Policy Context vs. Political Context
A third and final point we would like to make hinges on the 
distinction between policy and politics and on the complexity 
of the relation between politics, policy and outcomes. Rinaldi 
and Bekker write about the negative health outcomes of 
welfare chauvinism that: 
“Both universal access to healthcare and other redistributive 
welfare provisions, such as pensions and unemployment 
benefits, have been associated with increased population 
health either directly or indirectly. This confirms the idea 
that PRR parties could pose a threat to population health due 
to their exclusionary policy agenda, especially since positive 
effects of welfare chauvinism for the native population are not 
clear” (p. 8).
They conclude that “[w]elfare chauvinism might thus 
represent a paradox in which it harms its very own 
proponents, especially the most vulnerable (eg, people who 
are unemployed)” (p. 8). This is a very significant point: not 
only does welfare chauvinism negatively impact the nativist 
outsiders, it might also harm the ‘own people’ it is supposed 
to benefit. 
Consider the context of tuberculosis in the United kingdom 
in the past eight years. In that timeframe we see a centre 
right government actively operating a ‘hostile environment’ 
principle, designed to create a hostile environment to each and 
every migrant (regardless of their legal status). This principle 
plays out in the context of healthcare primarily in terms of 
questions of access. The social rationality is one where a 
beleaguered health service is seen to be struggling to provide 
healthcare to those entitled to it, because too many people 
(who are not entitled to free, at the point of use healthcare) 
are using it, either as legal migrants, illegal migrants or health 
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tourists. This functions to create ‘legitimate’ welfare chauvinist 
limitations on access to what is ostensibly a universal 
healthcare service – in theory making the healthcare system 
more accessible to those who are ‘entitled’ to access it. 
But this welfare chauvinism has other public health 
consequences. In parallels to the current UK COVID-19 
lockdown, the hostile environment policies (constructed with 
a rationality predicated on protecting healthcare for all those 
entitled to it), simultaneously work to create a very real public 
risk. Many immigrant groups in London experienced a spike 
in rates of tuberculosis following the hostile environment 
policies.15 This is attributed to these groups being unable to 
seek competent healthcare, for fear of arrest and deportation. 
In the context of what is a highly contagious disease, 
government policy can be seen to be actively working against 
the public health interest, and in fact, could be argued to 
be putting more strain on the beleaguered health service 
(through increased levels of mortality and morbidity) which 
it purports to want to protect. 
As such there is a fundamental contradiction between 
welfare chauvinism and actual health policy outcomes. These 
welfare chauvinist policies once the limits of this self-same 
chauvinism are considered next to the ‘hard’ consequences of 
that logic, including for the ‘natives,’ eg, increased mortality 
and morbidity at a population level. In this context, it 
becomes difficult to argue the sanctity of welfare chauvinism 
as an organising principle for health policy. In fact welfare 
chauvinism can be shown to work against the implementation 
of effective health policy. Instead of taking welfare chauvinism 
at face value, there is a need for analyses to demonstrate 
the ways in which welfare chauvinism is performed in very 
simplified and rhetorically empty ways, ways which work to 
prevent it being held to account against the cold hard facts 
that more people have become ill or died because of these 
policies. 
Conclusion
Rinaldi and Bekker’s scoping review shows that much work 
remains to be done if we are to arrive at a fuller understanding 
of the impact of PRR politics on welfare policy and health, 
and Rinaldi and Bekker already indicate some significant 
areas of further research. With the COVID-19-pandemic, 
there is little doubt that much work will be done on this in 
the next few years. In this article, we have suggested three 
considerations we take as key if future work on the PRR, 
welfare policy and health – but also on populism, nativism, 
welfare policy and health more broadly – is to avoid some of 
the pitfalls that have plagued research on populism and the 
radical right more generally. 
Firstly, analysis need to carefully consider the impact 
of the nativism and authoritarianism of the PRR and not 
overemphasize its populist character, and carefully consider 
what role the populist dimension of radical right (or left) 
politics actually plays in welfare and health policy. Analyses 
also should avoid attributing nativist and authoritarian 
tendencies to populism per se and avoid lumping together 
all populist politics as an undifferentiated threat to welfare 
and health. In practice, this means that studying the impact 
of ‘populism’ in isolation – as too much commentary on 
the COVID-19-pandemic has done – is bound to result in 
analytical problems as well as normative issues.16
Secondly, analysis of the PRR (or the populist left for 
that matter) need to be embedded in broader reflections on 
nativist, populist and other threats to healthcare coming from 
other parts of the political spectrum, whilst also considering 
the potentially positive effects of certain kinds of populist 
politics. 
Thirdly, the consequences of populism and nativism can 
only be gauged properly if we do not take political rhetoric 
at face value. Populist rhetoric does not necessarily go hand 
in hand with an actual championing of the interests of the 
‘ordinary people’ (as the Trump presidency proves, to give but 
one example), nor does welfare chauvinist rhetoric or even 
policy necessarily have positive impacts on ‘the own people’ 
(as we have argued above). Research on welfare and health 
policy and its outcomes needs to pay attention to the complex 
relations between political rhetoric, policy and their (intended 
and unintended) outcomes. This is not easy to implement, but 
requires a nuanced and multifaceted understanding of how 
politics and policy work and interrelate which would likely 
depend on interdisciplinarity and the combination of diverse 
methodologies. 
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